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Abstract 
 Although the Alternative Uses divergent thinking task has been widely used in 
psychometric and experimental studies of creativity, the cognitive processes underlying 
this task have not been examined in detail before the two studies are reported here. In 
Experiment 1, a verbal protocol analysis study of the Alternative Uses task was carried 
out with a think aloud group (N = 40) and a silent control group (N=64). The groups did 
not differ in fluency or novelty of idea production indicating no verbal overshadowing. 
Analysis of protocols from the think aloud group suggested that initial responses were 
based on a strategy of Retrieval from long term memory of pre-known uses. Later 
responses tended to be based on a small number of other strategies: Property- use 
generation, imagined Disassembly of the target object into components and scanning of 
Broad Use categories for possible uses of the target item. Novelty of uses was particularly 
associated with the Disassembly strategy. Experiment 2 (N = 103) addressed the role of 
executive processes in generating new and previously known uses by examining 
individual differences in category fluency, letter fluency and divergent task performance. 
After completing the task participants were asked to indicate which of their responses 
were new for them. It was predicted and found in regression analyses that letter fluency 
(an executively loading task) was related to production of „new‟ uses and category 
fluency was related to production of „old‟ uses but not vice versa. 
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The ability to generate many different possible solutions to a problem is an important 
aspect of creative thinking and has been specifically addressed in the psychometric 
tradition by means of divergent thinking tests (Guilford, 1971; Guilford, Christensen, 
Merrifield & Wilson, 1978) in which participants are asked to generate as many 
alternative solutions as they can (Plucker & Renzulli, 1999). These tests contrast with 
convergent thinking tests in which there is but a single solution, e.g., Raven‟s Matrices 
(1960) and other standard intelligence tests. The Alternative Uses task is a prototypical 
divergent task in which the goal is to generate many possible uses, different from the 
common use, for familiar objects.  In this task, the responses produced may be completely 
novel for the individual; for example, with the target item “barrel”, a use as “a source of 
termite food” might be produced by a participant who had never before seen, heard or 
thought of such a use. In Boden‟s (2004, p.2) terminology, divergent production tasks can 
therefore involve “personal-psychological creativity”,  i.e., producing an idea that is new 
to the person who produces it, irrespective of how many people have had that idea before.  
In validation studies, divergent tests have been found to be better correlated with real life 
measures of creative behavior, such as, gaining patents, producing novels and plays, 
founding businesses or professional organizations (Torrance, 1981, 1988; Plucker, 1999), 
than were convergent tests of intelligence. The Alternative Uses task then represents a 
convenient paradigm for the study of creative processes and so this task has often been 
used in psychometric and experimental studies of creativity. 
  
Although a number of convergent thinking tasks, such as Raven‟s Matrices, analogies 
and syllogisms, have been analyzed into component cognitive processes (e.g., Hunt, 
1974;1999; Keane et al., 1994; Stenning and Oberlander, 1995), the Alternative Uses 
task does not appear to have been analyzed in this way and the experiments reported here 
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aimed to remedy this deficit.  Process analysis of complex cognitive tasks has typically 
involved use of think aloud methods (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Gilhooly & Green, 1996; 
Green & Gilhooly, 1996). Such methods have been extensively applied in analyses of 
problem solving (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972, on missionaries and cannibals, 
cryptarithmetic and chess; Gilhooly et al., 1999, on Tower of London) and in some 
studies of insight and functional fixity (Keane, 1989; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004) as 
sources of hypotheses and data regarding underlying processes. Experiment 1 in the 
present paper applied a think-aloud method, which has proven useful in other domains, to  
the Alternative Uses task with a view to identifying underlying processes and strategies 
in this creative thinking task. 
 
As Ericsson and Simon (1993) argue, a task analysis is often a useful preliminary step 
and can suggest likely types of processes. In the Alternative Uses task it does seem a 
priori likely that some uses will be derived from searches of episodic memory for already 
known uses (some of which may be uncommon) and some will be derived from searches 
of semantic memory for object properties which can support different uses. This intuition 
is supported by the category generation studies of Vallee-Tourangeau, Anthony and 
Austin (1998) and Walker and Kintsch (1985). Vallee-Tourangeau et al.(1998)  found in 
a study of strategies for generation of ad hoc categories (e.g., “ things people take to a 
wedding”) that such categories were most often initially  generated by an experiential 
strategy, where memories of specific experiences were invoked and secondarily by a 
semantic strategy, in which abstract conceptual characteristics were used to generate 
exemplars. Similarly, in a study of strategies in retrieving taxonomic category instances 
(automobiles, soups and detergents) Walker and Kintsch (1985) found a high degree of 
usage of strategies that depended on personal episodic memory (77%) with the remaining 
strategies based on semantic knowledge. These previous studies suggest that we could 
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expect to find episodic memory of previously known uses to be common and to be the 
basis of initial responses in the Alternative Uses task with semantically based uses 
occurring more rarely and later in the response sequence.  
  
An important issue in the use of think aloud procedures is that, although such methods 
have been found informative in many domains, some studies have suggested that 
thinking aloud may alter the way in which tasks are processed. Ericsson and Simon 
(1993) on the basis of an extensive review of studies employing think aloud methods 
reported that when think aloud was concurrent with the task and was direct reporting of 
information in working memory, then think aloud was a non-reactive method. However, 
Schooler, Ohlsson and Brooks (1993) reported that thinking aloud with direct concurrent 
reporting had an interfering effect on performance on three insight problem solving tasks. 
This result is known as verbal overshadowing and although it has not been reliably 
replicated with insight tasks (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004), it is good practice in think aloud 
studies to include a control condition in which participants work silently in order to 
assess possible verbal overshadowing effects. Experiment 1, reported below, included a 
suitable control condition and tests for possible reactive effects of think aloud. 
Experiment 2, reported below, built on the strategy results of Experiment 1 and 
addressed the role of executive processes in the strategy based generation of responses 
which were self-classed as novel for the participant.  
 
Experiment 1:  A think aloud study of divergent thinking. 
Method 
Participants: 40 participants (32 female, 8 male) took part in the think aloud condition 
and a control group of 64 (51 female, 13 male) participants worked silently in a group 
setting. Both groups produced written responses. All participants were university 
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students. 
Procedure: The following instructions were given to both think aloud and control groups. 
“You will be asked to produce as many different uses as you can think of, which are 
different from the normal use, for a number of common objects. For example, the 
common use for a newspaper is for reading, but it could also be used for swatting flies, to 
line drawers, to make a paper hat and so on. You will have two minutes on each object. 
Its common use will be stated but you are to try to produce possible uses which are 
different from the normal one and different in kind from each other. Any questions? 
I will tell you when to stop on each item. You will have two minutes for each item”.  
 
Participants were then presented with the names of 6 items, one at a time, for which they 
were to produce novel uses in writing. The items were brick, car tyre, barrel, pencil, shoe, 
and hanger. In each case the common use was given and other different uses were 
requested. 
The think aloud group were also first given standard instructions adapted from Ericsson 
and Simon (1993), as follows. 
“In this experiment we are interested in what you think about when you find solutions to 
some problems I am going to ask you to do. In order to do this, I am going to ask you to 
think aloud as you work on the problems you are given. What I mean by “think aloud” is 
that I want you to tell me everything you are thinking from the time you first see the 
question until you reach a solution or I tell you to stop working on the problem. I would 
like you to talk aloud constantly from the time I present each problem until you are asked 
to stop. I don‟t want you to plan out what you say or try to explain to me what you are 
saying. Just act as if you are alone in the room speaking to yourself. It is most important 
that you keep talking. If you are silent for any long period of time, I will ask you to talk. 
Please try to speak as clearly as possible as I will be recording you as you speak. Do you 
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understand what I want you to do? 
We will start with a practice problem to get you used to thinking aloud.  While thinking 
aloud, tell me how many windows there are in your parents‟ house?” 
 
After the think-aloud practice task, participants received the Alternative Uses task 
instructions and proceeded to carry out the Alternative Uses task while thinking aloud. 
Results 
In the results reported below, all confidence intervals and tests used α = .05 
Comparisons of think aloud and silent working conditions 
Although thinking aloud is generally found not to affect performance in thinking tasks 
(Ericsson and Simon, 1993), in some cases interfering effects (“verbal overshadowing”) 
have been reported (Schooler et al., 1993) and so it is customary to carry out  checks on 
possible reactive effects of thinking aloud before analyzing the verbal protocols.  
 
The total uses produced per participant over the 6 items for the Think aloud and Silent 
groups were very similar. The Think aloud mean (with 95% confidence interval) = 27.25 
(+/- 3.14) uses, SD = 10.12;  Silent mean = 26.43 (+/- 2.09) uses, SD =  8.26. Reported 
uses were rated on a 7 point scale for novelty (1 = not at all novel ; 7 = highly novel) by 
an independent judge.  A second judge rated a random sample of 50 of the proposed uses 
and the two judges showed a satisfactory degree of inter-judge reliability (r =.85 +/- .08,  
df =48,  p <.01). The average rated novelty of uses produced was similar for Think aloud 
and Silent conditions. The Think aloud mean novelty = 2.54 (+/- .12), SD = 0.74; Silent 
mean novelty = 2.45 (+/- .12), SD = 0.51. We also examined correlations between number 
of uses produced and average novelty for the think aloud and silent groups separately. 
These two measures are usually moderately correlated. The two correlations were very 
similar (for Silent group, r = .43 (+/- .10), df = 62, p <.01; for Think aloud group r = .49 
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(+/- .12), df =38, p < .01). These comparisons between the think aloud and silent working 
groups are re-assuring in that the results support the view that the think aloud requirement 
did not affect the normal flow of processing and that verbal overshadowing was not 
present.  
Protocol analysis 
The think aloud protocols were transcribed and segmented into short phrases as is 
standard in protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Gilhooly & Green, 1996). An 
overall total of 2,343 segments were identified over the 40 participants‟ attempts at the 6 
divergent items.  The segments were classified into an initial set of 18 substantive 
categories which were taken to reflect different processes involved in carrying out the 
Alternative Uses task plus a residual “Other” category (which accounted for less than 1% 
of segments). The 15 categories which each accounted for more than 1 % of segments are 
listed in order of frequency below (with average % incidence per participant and 95% 
confidence interval), together with a brief characterization and example segment in each 
case. Also listed is the % of participants who had responses in each category; these 
figures indicate that none of the categories were solely due to a small minority of 
individual participants. The coding scheme was checked for reliability by having a sample 
of 100 segments coded by a second judge. Simple agreement was found for 84% of the 
segments and the Kappa statistic (Fleiss, 1981), which adjusts for chance levels of 
agreement, was 0.81. We concluded that the coding scheme was sufficiently reliable to 
proceed with further analysis. 
 
Coding scheme 
1. Unmediated use (33.3% +/- 3.3%): States possible use without explanation. E.g. “A 
tyre could be used as a floatation aid”. Shown by 100% of participants. 
2. Item naming.  (11.66% +/- 1.5%): Repeats name of item. E.g. “Brick, brick, brick…” 
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Shown by 83% of participants. 
3. Episodic Memory use. (9.2% +/- 1.7%): States possible use with reference to a specific 
memory. E.g. “I remember my father used a brick to stop a car rolling away.” Shown by 
75% of participants. 
4. Use query.  (5.9% +/- 0.90%). Poses use problem. “Now what else could I use a shoe 
for?” Shown by 78% of participants. 
5. Dominant use. (5.7% +/- 0.8%). States main use of object. E.g., “A pencil can be used 
to write things.” Shown by 85% of participants. 
6. Dissassembly uses. (5.5% +/-1.3%).  States a way of decomposing the target item and 
using the resulting components. E.g., “Remove laces from shoe and use them to tie your 
hair up.” Shown by 80% of participants. 
7. Repeat use.  (3.6% +/-0.7%). Repeats an already stated use for the target item. E.g., “A 
brick could used as a weapon… <possible intervening segments>……Use brick as a 
weapon.” Shown by 68% of participants. 
8. Property. (3.4% +/- 0.7%). States property of object. E.g., “Bricks are heavy”. Shown 
by 55% of participants. 
9. General use (3.5% +/- 0.8%). States very wide category of use. E.g., “A barrel could be 
used as part of a work of art”. Shown by 68% of participants. 
10. Impasse (3.4% +/- 0.6%). Indicates participant cannot report any further uses at this 
point. E.g., “I can‟t think of anything else to do with a pencil.” Shown by 68% of 
participants. 
11. Property Use. (2.9% +/- 0.7%). Explicitly indicates property which enables the stated 
use. E.g., “A pencil is sharp so can be used to poke holes in paper.” Shown by 48% of 
participants. 
12. Example use. (3.0% +/- 0.5%). After a General use, gives more specific examples. 
E.g., (After saying “A brick could be used in building things”), “A brick could be used for 
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building walls, paths, roads, channels for water.” Shown by 68% of participants. 
13. Imagery. (3.0%, +/-1.2% ). Indicates forming a mental image. E.g., “I am imagining a 
car tyre”. Shown by 40% of participants. 
14. Context. (2.9%, +/- 1.2%). Mentions context in which target object often found. E.g., 
“You often see tyres in garages.” Shown by 40% of participants. 
15. Broad Use First (2.9%, +/- 1.2%). Considers target object against an initially broad 
use category. E.g., “Could a barrel be used as a kind of transport? Yes, you could float 
things in it down a river.” Shown by 28% of participants. 
 
To facilitate further analysis the above detailed codes were grouped into four larger 
strategy and two process categories. 
 The process categories were as follows:  
 
1. Memory use production. Retrieval from memory of alternative uses, 
either unmediated, without mention of specific memories or mediated, 
with specific reference to prior knowledge acquired through direct or 
indirect experience. Unmediated uses are presumed to derive from  
knowledge held in long term memory and hence are grouped with uses 
deriving from episodic long term memory. Segments coded as 
Unmediated or Memory based are taken to indicate this strategy. 
2. Property use production. Retrieving and scanning properties of the 
object and then using these properties as cues to retrieve uses which 
require those properties. Segments coded as Property or Property based 
are taken to indicate this strategy.  
3. Broad use based production. Reviewing object against a number of 
broad uses , such as “Transport”, “Weapon”, “Aesthetic”, for possible 
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application.  Segments coded as General Use, Example Use, Broad use 
first, are taken to indicate this strategy. 
4. Disassembly use production. Imagining disassembling the object and 
using parts or recombining parts. This corresponds to the single code 
Disassembly uses. 
 
Two broad types of processes were identified: 
1. Self-cueing. Repeating object name, imaging object and recalling object contexts, 
apparently to cue relevant information. Segments coded as Image, Object naming 
and Context are taken as indicating this process.  
2. Intrusions. Repeating already given uses for object or stating dominant use 
(against instructions). Segments coded as Repeat or Dominant use are taken as 
indicating this process. 
 
Relating strategies and processes to performance measures 
We examined whether frequencies of strategies and processes were linked to fluency and 
novelty of production as follows. The frequencies of the 4 main strategies and the 2 other 
processes were obtained by summing the respective segment level codes per participant. 
Average novelty per participant was obtained by rating each use produced on a 7 point 
scale of novelty (7 = highly novel) and averaging over uses for each participant. 
Distributional data are shown in Table 1. Those measures which were positively skewed 
(Property, Broad Use, Dissassembly and Intrusions) were satisfactorily corrected by 
square root transformations for subsequent analyses. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
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Correlations were then obtained between the performance and strategy measures. These 
are given in Table 2. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
 
 From the simple correlations it appears that fluency of performance in divergent thinking 
is mainly determined by frequency of the Memory strategy while novelty is more related 
to use of Disassembly and Broad Use strategies with a lesser contribution from Memory  
strategies. Given that there are correlations among the measures of strategy frequency, in 
order to clarify the interrelations between strategy, process and production measures 
further, we carried out simultaneous multiple regression analyses with number of written 
responses and average novelty as the dependent variables and the strategy and process 
variables as predictors.  
 
The regression results were broadly consistent with the simple correlations and indicate 
that Disassembly strategy frequency made a strong independent contribution to novelty of 
uses when other factors are taken into account (β = .57, t(34) = 4.60, p  < .01). Memory 
strategy frequency also made an independent contribution to predicting novelty (β = .37, 
t(34) = 3.15,  p < .01). Broad use strategy did not make a substantial contribution to 
novelty when other variables were taken into account (β =0.16,  t(34) = 1.25, ns) 
suggesting that the significant simple correlation with number of uses was largely due to 
confounding with other more influential variables.  Regarding fluency (i.e., number of 
uses produced), Memory strategy is the sole independent predictor when other variables 
are taken into account (β= .73, t(34) = 6.71,  p < .01). 
  
Order of occurrence of strategies 
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To check for differences in the typical order of occurrence of strategies, the first incidence 
of the indicators of each strategy was obtained for each of the 6 target items and averaged 
for each participant. Overall, Memory Strategy tended to appear first in the sequence of 
protocol segments at an average segment sequence position of 2.59 (+/- .40), while 
Disassembly, Broad Use and Property Strategies first appeared on average at positions 
5.27 (+/- .75),  5.35 (+/- .60)  and 6.06 (+/- 1.03) respectively. Thus, Memory Strategy 
tended to occur earlier than the others (indeed occurred first in 97.5% of rankings of order 
of occurrence for the 40 participants) but there was no strong difference between the later 
appearing strategies in terms of order of appearance.  
 
Discussion 
There was no evidence in this study to suggest that the think aloud procedure caused 
verbal overshadowing in the Alternative Uses task and the verbal protocols yielded 
readily interpretable results. Memory responses were frequent and tended to be produced 
early. Uses produced in this way were of uses pre-known to the individual and did not 
therefore involve any personal-psychological creativity (Boden, 2004). It seems that 
Memory responses would generally be produced first as these will tend to occur 
automatically and rapidly in response to the item cue. Other strategies are presumed to be 
more effortful and executively demanding and would be expected to occur later when the 
initial automatic retrievals have been exhausted. When Memory use production had 
exhausted readily retrieved instances of experienced alternative uses, most participants 
switched to the other strategies which could produce more novel uses. We now consider 
processes involved in the more demanding strategies in turn. 
Property Use Production can be interpreted as involving  (1) retrieval of one or more 
properties of the target object and (2) a search of semantic memory for uses or functions 
which have as a requirement the retrieved property or properties. Property Use Production 
 14 
could give rise to personally novel uses not previously thought of or experienced by the 
person (e.g., using a brick as a pillow on the basis of its size and shape). Theoretically, 
object properties may be retrieved from an amodal semantic representation or through an 
imagery process in which an image of the object is generated and examined for 
properties. Some 40% of our think aloud participants did speak at least once of “seeing” 
the objects while searching mentally for uses which strongly suggests some involvement 
of imagery. This is consistent with LeBoutillier & Marks‟s (2003) finding in a meta-
analytic study of 9 experiments with a total of 1494 participants of a relationship between 
imagery ability and creativity as indexed by divergent thinking tasks.   
Disassembly as a strategy involved imagining the breaking up of the item into 
components (e.g., a shoe may be broken up into sole, upper and laces), each of which can 
then serve as “input” to Memory or Property Use Production. The Disassembly strategy 
was particularly associated with production of uses judged to be highly novel. 
 
Broad Use  Production was relatively infrequently observed and involved considering 
possible broad categories of use such as “means of transport” and  determining whether 
the target object had properties permitting that broad use. The Broad Use Production 
strategy is similar to an approach found to be fruitful in Finke‟s (1993) study of the 
Geneplore model of creativity in the creative synthesis task. In this task participants are 
requested to combine given shapes “to make interesting and potentially useful objects”. 
Finke found that if combinations were produced without a pre-set detailed goal and then 
interpreted as examples of many different broad categories, such as furniture, tools, toys 
and so on, overall creativity of the combinations was higher than when specific goals 
were preset. Similarly, in the Alternative Uses task the Broad Use strategy seeks to 
interpret target objects, such as a shoe, as possible examples of a range of broad uses such 
as means of transport, furniture, ornaments, foodstuff etc. By this means a shoe might be 
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ascribed a possible transport use, e.g., a letter could be put in a shoe and then be 
transported by throwing the shoe over a high wall. 
  
Overall, we found that episodic memory strategies predominated early in the process and 
were then followed by strategies which were based on more abstract semantic knowledge 
of properties of the target items. Vallee-Tourangeau et al., (1998) and Walker and Kintsch 
(1985) found similar patterns in studies of strategies in generation of ad hoc and 
taxonomic categories respectively, in that such categories were most often generated by 
an experiential strategy, where memories of specific experiences were invoked and 
secondarily by a semantic strategy, in which abstract conceptual characteristics were used 
to generate exemplars. Property, Broad Use and Disassembly strategies could be regarded 
as different semantic strategies. Memory strategies do not produce personally novel uses 
and are likely to be less executively demanding than the  semantic strategies and so the 
next study addresses the relationship between executive functions and the personal 
novelty of uses produced.  
 
 Experiment 2: Executive Functions and Old v. New uses. 
 
The   results of Experiment 1 above suggested that participants engaged in a range of 
strategies when carrying out the Alternative Uses task. Use of strategies is usually 
accepted to involve a marked degree of executive control in various ways. Two generally 
acknowledged executive processes (Baddeley, 2003; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki 
& Howerter, 2000) are inhibition and switching. In divergent production the dominant use 
of the object must be inhibited. Furthermore, the Memory strategy will require inhibition 
of earlier produced dominant memories as the process continues to produce responses.  
Furthermore, possible responses will have to be evaluated for suitability and unsuitable 
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ones inhibited. A decision will have to be made as to when to switch from the Memory 
strategy to one of the other strategies. If the Property Use Production process is running, 
further decisions about switching from one property cue to another will be required, 
coupled with inhibition of previously used cues. Theoretically, deliberate switching of 
retrieval cues in this way is seen as a central executive function in working memory 
models (Baddeley and Logie, 1999; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin & Conway, 1999) and so 
the central executive would be expected to be involved in divergent production of novel 
uses. Interestingly, the standard task used for loading the central executive (random 
generation of items from a set, such as digits 1-9) requires novel response sequences. 
Random generation requires constant switching of the bases for responses (i.e. 
flexibility), overcoming habits and breaking sets, as is the case with divergent production 
tasks. Thus, the notion that executive processes are involved in production of novel 
responses is intrinsic to the working memory model. 
 
Empirical results also support the view that executive functions are involved in divergent 
production and so it would be expected that divergent production of new uses would be 
correlated with performance on other executively loading tasks such as letter fluency 
(Phillips, 1997). Martin, Wiggs, Lalonde and Mack (1994) found that a secondary 
executive loading task impaired performance on a letter fluency task (i.e., produce as 
many words beginning with specified letter as possible in a set time) more than on a 
category fluency task (i.e., produce as many examples as possible of a common 
taxonomic category). This is interesting because letter fluency is generally regarded as 
more dependent on flexible responding (an executive function) than is category fluency. 
Conversely, they found that secondary task with a low executive load interfered more 
with category fluency than with letter fluency. Category-fluency is regarded as more 
dependent on automatic spreading activation than is the letter fluency task. Elsinger and 
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Grattan (1993) found an impairment in frontal patients in Alternative Uses performance 
which again is consistent with executive involvement in divergent production, given the 
strong link between executive processes and frontal areas of the brain. Overall, there 
appears to be a good case that executive processes are involved strongly in divergent 
production. 
 
The processes for carrying out the Alternative Uses task which have been  proposed here 
indicate that Memory responses tend to occur first and so early responses will tend to be 
pre-known or “old” uses already stored in long term memory. Property-, Broad Use- and 
Disassembly uses tended to be produced later. This suggests that responses to the 
Alternative Uses task could be split into “old” (previously known, drawn from memory) 
and “new” (not previously known, generated during the task for the first time for the 
participants concerned.) Previous analyses of Alternative Uses  response data have not 
separated these types of responses, but it may be important to do so because, on our 
analysis, “old” and “new” responses arise through different processes. A rather similar 
point was made on a priori grounds by Quellmalz (1985) in an evaluative review of the 
Alternate Uses Test in which he argued that : 
“ If Alternate Uses is proposed as a measure of creativity, it would be necessary to 
distinguish newly proposed uses from previously experienced uses, i.e., to disentangle 
background experience from creativity.” 
 
In line with Quellmalz‟s point and following from our analyses of Experiment 1, in 
Experiment 2 reported below, participants were asked to identify which of their responses 
to an Alternative Uses task were “old” and which were “new” to them and had been first 
thought of during the experiment. Since “new” uses, in our view, always arise from more  
executively involving  processes we predicted that frequency of “new” uses would 
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correlate with performance in a task, which  also draws on executive processes viz., the 
letter fluency task (Martin et al., 1994; Elsinger & Grattan, 1993). Conversely, we 
predicted that frequency of production of “old” uses deriving from the Memory strategy 
would correlate with performance on category fluency, since both of these are presumed 
to involve retrieval through relatively automatic processes such as spreading activation 
(Martin et al., 1994). 
 
 
Method 
Participants: 103 students from Brunel and Oxford Brookes Universities in England acted 
as participants (83 female, 20 male). 
Procedure: Participants each carried out a single Alternative Uses divergent thinking task, 
under silent working conditions, for 2 minutes. 54 participants were tested with the item 
“Tyre” and 49 were tested with the item “Barrel”. In both cases standard instructions were 
given, as in Experiment 1. Responses were written. 
After completion of the divergent production phase, participants were asked to indicate by 
circling, for each use they had produced, which were first thought of while doing the task 
i.e., had never before seen or heard of before, either in their own experience or in films, 
books, television etc. Participants then carried out a category fluency task (name as many 
animals as possible) for 3 minutes and a letter fluency task (produce as many different 
examples as possible of words starting with “H”) for 1 minute.   
 
Results 
Participants were able to follow the instruction to indicate “new” responses. Examples of 
“new” and “old” responses to the “Tyre” item are given below and appear to have 
considerable face validity. 
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“Old”      “New” 
A swing     A measuring device 
A crash barrier    A picture frame 
A float      To hide things in 
Part of assault course    As waist protection 
 
To examine further the validity of the self defined division into “old” and “new” 
responses,  20 “old” and 20 “new” responses were rated for novelty on a 7 point scale (7 
= highly novel) by an independent judge. The “old” and “new” responses were paired in 
that each pair of responses came from a particular different participant chosen at random. 
It was expected that self-defined “new” uses would also tend to be seen as more novel by 
other observers. “Old” uses received a mean novelty rating of 3.37 (+/- .51) and “new” 
uses had a mean novelty rating of 4.80 (+/- .61). This difference was highly significant, 
t(19) = 3.49,  p < .01.  
Our analysis  suggests that “old” responses are produced through memory based 
responding and this occurs at an early stage while “new” responses arise through later 
occurring strategic processes. Thus, the average output position of “new” responses in the 
sequence of uses produced should be later than the average output position of “old” 
responses. As expected, the average output position (5.81 +/- .12, SD = 1.23) of the 
“new” uses produced in this study was significantly later than the average output position 
(3.48 +/- .09, SD = 0.85) of the “old” uses , t(102) =10.02, p <.001.  
 
Descriptive statistics for numbers of responses for “old”, “new”, category fluency and 
letter fluency are given in Table 3 for the groups responding to “Tyre” and “Barrel” target 
items separately. The two groups were similar on all measures as shown in Table 3 and so 
the groups‟ data were merged in the following analyses in order to clarify the patterns of 
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results, which were similar in the unpooled data.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
  Correlations among the variables for the merged data of 103 participants are shown in 
Table 4. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
As predicted on the basis of the analysis outlined here, the simple correlations indicate 
that “new” use production was more strongly linked to the executively loading task of 
letter fluency than to category fluency while “old” use production was more strongly 
related to category fluency, which is generally seen as being relatively more based on 
automatic spreading activation than to letter fluency. To clarify the interrelationships 
further, simultaneous multiple regressions were run for “new” and “old” uses as 
dependent variables and the fluency scores as predictors.   
 
The regression results indicated clearly that fluency of production of “new” uses was 
predicted by letter fluency (β = .34, t(101) = 3.25,  p <.01) but not by category fluency  
(β= .05, t(101)= 0.49, ns) and vice versa for “old” uses which were predicted by category 
fluency (β = .29, t(101) = 2.72,  p < .01) but not by letter fluency (β = -.17, t(101) =-1.57. 
ns) 
 
Discussion 
This study examined the utility of a new method of scoring responses to the Alternative 
Uses task which involved having participants self categorise their responses as new to 
them or not, where “new” responses were those not previously experienced either directly 
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or vicariously and first thought of during the task. Participants were able to follow the 
instructions and the self reported categorizations had face validity. The validity of the self 
categorization procedure was further supported in that “new” uses were rated by an 
independent judge as more novel than “old” uses. Self categorized “new” responses 
occurred later in the output series than “old” responses. A further result of this study is 
that production of personally judged “new” uses is related to ability to carry out a 
different executively loading task, viz., letter fluency, while production of “old” responses 
was not linked to letter fluency. This is supportive of the present analysis which posits 
executively loading strategies as underlying “new” use production. Our interpretation of 
this result is that participants with greater executive capacity were better able to carry out 
demanding strategies in both letter fluency and alternative uses, hence the observed 
correlation. On the other hand, production of personally judged “old” uses was more 
associated with performance of a task (taxonomic category fluency) which reflects largely 
automatic retrieval processes (although executive capacity would also have some role).  
This is also consistent with the view of the present analysis that “old” responses are 
mainly due to automatic retrieval of uses from long term memory. However, it is 
acknowledged that executive processes may also be involved in taxonomic category 
fluency; for example, in generating animal names it can be useful to switch the basis of 
search from domestic to wild animals and so on. Part of the correlation between category 
fluency and letter fluency may well reflect this overlap in type of resources employed in 
the two tasks. Our interpretation here is on the basis that letter fluency is more demanding 
of executive capacity than is taxonomic category fluency rather than that taxonomic 
category fluency does not involve executive capacity at all. Finally, it may be noted that 
the differential links of letter fluency to new uses and category fluency to old uses 
emerged most clearly from simultaneous regression analyses which took account of 
possible confounding and suppression effects among the variables. 
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 General discussion 
The work reported here aimed to cast light on the processes underlying performance in 
the Alternative Uses divergent thinking task. Although divergent thinking is important in 
creative thinking, insight problem solving and overcoming functional fixity, analyses of 
the cognitive processes involved in divergent thinking did not appear to have been carried 
out before. On the basis of the think aloud study reported in Experiment 1, we identified 
four main strategies: Memory, Property, Broad Use  and Dissassembly strategies.   Initial 
responses are based on a Memory strategy of retrieval from long term memory of pre-
known uses. This is seen as a relatively automatic process of retrieving uses associated in 
past experience with the target objects. The Memory strategy was associated strongly 
with fluency of use production and made an independent contribution to average novelty 
of production (as rated by an independent judge). Thus extensive use of  the Memory 
strategy can generate unusual uses which have been experienced by relatively few people 
but such uses are not truly cases of personal-psychological creativity in Boden‟s terms 
(2004, p.4). It is noteworthy that the first responses tend to be based on contextualized 
personal experience stored as episodic or more generalized autobiographical memories. 
This type of retrieval appears to be relatively automatic, rapid, and not heavily loading of 
executive capacity. Later responses tend to be based on slower, more effortful, and 
executively loading strategies. The general pattern of episodic, contextualised retrieval 
strategies followed by more semantically based strategies was also found by Vallee-
Tourangeau et al. (1998) and Walker and Kintsch (1985) in studies of ad hoc and 
taxonomic category generation respectively.   
 
Following Experiment 1 we suggested that subjectively old or pre-known responses could 
be distinguished from subjectively new responses which are generated for the first time 
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during the experiment. In terms of Barsalou‟s (1983, 1991) approach to conceptual 
knowledge and processing, producing new uses for a familiar object is equivalent to 
cross-classifying the object into new ad hoc use categories. For example a wooden chair 
(probably initially categorized only as a member of the category “things which one can sit 
on”) could be cross-classified as a member of  many other categories such as “things that 
could be used as emergency firewood”, “things that can be stood on”, “things that could 
hold doors open” and so on. Such cross-classifications generally arise only in the context 
of specific goals and Barsalou (1983) suggested that automatic elicitation of many cross-
classifications in the absence of relevant goals would normally be undesirable and highly 
distracting as objects can be cross-classified in an indefinite number of ways. The 
Alternative Uses task is a special situation in which the person is actually given the 
unusual goal of producing as many cross-classifications as possible. Barsalou (1983) 
found that cross-classifying objects into new ad hoc categories was facilitated by 
provision of goals. The Broad Use strategy may work in a similar fashion by self-
generating possible goals (e.g., “Use as transport”) which then facilitate cross-classifying 
the target items as  objects that can meet the self-generated possible goals (e.g. , to meet 
the “Use as transport” goal,  “use shoe as means of transporting small objects while 
walking”). 
 
The second experiment examined the role of executive capacity in generating new and old 
use responses. Ability to produce “old” responses, presumed to be derived from memory 
of pre-known uses, was associated with ability to retrieve items from a well known 
taxonomic category. It may be suggested that in both cases memory based strategies 
underlie performance and involve low executive loads. Participants characterized by less 
executive capacity then find it harder in divergent production to switch to other strategies 
and to resist intrusions of previous uses. Participants who had greater executive capacity 
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as indicated by higher response scores on the letter fluency task produced more “new” 
responses in divergent production. This association of divergent production with 
executive functioning suggests further studies which more explicitly test differences in 
particular executive functions such as switching and inhibition in relation to Alternative 
Uses performance.  
Other fruitful lines for future research would include examining effects of different modes 
of item presentation such as pictures or actual objects as against object names. Different 
modes of presentation would be expected to make different properties salient which in 
turn should affect new uses produced through the Property strategy. Also, mental 
workload might be reduced by picture or object presentations since properties would be 
generally more readily accessible. Such stimulus support would be expected to yield more 
responses than found with standard verbal label presentation, as well as leading to 
different properties being used as bases for responding.  The separate measurement of 
“new” and “old” responses for individuals suggests possibilities for future psychometric 
research. It would be expected that the “new” responses measure would be a more valid 
predictor of real life creativity than total responses (which mixes “old” and “new” 
together). Work is required to explore further the reliability and general validity of the 
“new” response measure in the Alternative Uses task. 
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Table 1. Number and novelty (rated on 7 point scale, 7 = high) of written uses produced 
and frequencies of main strategies and processes. Descriptive statistics. N = 40. 
    Mean 95% CI SD  Skew  
Production measures 
Written Uses   27.28   +/- 3.13 10.12  -.01 
Average novelty    2.54 +/-.23    .74   .37 
Strategies 
Memory   23.47 +/-2.67 8.60   .81 
Property     4.05 +/-1.87 6.04  2.93 
Broad use     4.72 +/-1.67 5.37  1.66  
Disassembly     3.27 +/-1.45 4.67  4.05 
Processes 
Self cueing   14.00 +/-2.90 9.37     .63 
Intrusions      6.02 +/-1.78 5.74   1.65 
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Table 2. Pearson correlations between strategy, process and production measures. N = 40. 
  
   1.  2.         3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8. 
1.Written Uses 1.00 .50** .73** .11 .09 .23 -.11 .20  
2. Average novelty  1.00   .33* .12 .42** .62** -.20 -.14         
3. Memory    1.00 -.06 .01 -.04 -.14 .08 
4. Property     1.00 .18 .20 .19 .38*     
5. Broad use      1.00 .38* -.19 -.16  
6. Disassembly       1.00 -.04 .02 
7. Self cueing        1.00 .47** 
8. Intrusions         1.00 
 
** = p< .01, * = p<.05. 2 tail tests.        
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 Table 3: Descriptive statistics . Numbers of “Old” and “New” alternative uses for “Tyre” 
(N= 54) and “Barrel” (N=49). Numbers of items produced in Category Fluency (Cat. 
Flu.) and Letter Fluency (Let.Flu) tasks.  
   “Tyre” group   “Barrel” group  
  Mean   CI   SD  Mean CI   SD   
 
“Old”  3.93    +/-.72   2.68  4.18    +/-.69     2.45   
“New”  2.83   +/-.67   2.53  3.43  +/-.78   2.77   
 
Cat. Flu. 33.74  +/-2.64   9.89  34.59  +/-1.08   8.22   
 
Let. Flu. 13.39  +/-1.17   4.39  14.83  +/-1.13   4.02   
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Table 5:  Pearson correlations among numbers of “Old” and “New” uses produced and 
numbers of items produced in Category Fluency and letter Fluency tasks. N= 103.  
 
       
    1.  2.  3.  4. 
 Variable 
1. “Old”   1.0  -.27**  .22*  -.04 
 
2. “New”     1.0  .20*  .36** 
 
3. Category Fluency.     1.0  .44** 
 
4. Letter Fluency        1.0 
 
p < .05.  ** p < .01 
 
